Modern markets show considerable micro efficiency (for the reason that the minority who spot aberrations from micro efficiency can make money from those occurrences and, in doing so, they tend to wipe out any persistent inefficiencies). In no contradiction to the previous sentence, I had hypothesized considerable macro inefficiency, in the sense of long waves in the time series of aggregate indexes of security prices below and above various definitions of fundamental values." 2 We will put this dictum the test in terms of the simplest efficient markets model that asserts that stock prices equal the expected present value (with constant discount rates) of expected future dividends. We will examine Samuelson's dictum by the simple method of running a regression of future multi-year dividend changes on current dividend-price ratios and testing whether the dividend-price ratio predicts these changes, along lines shown in Campbell and Shiller [1998] , [2001] , but for individual stocks 1926-2001, as well as for stock indexes. This will allow us to see in very direct terms whether the simple efficient markets model works better for individual stocks than it does for indexes.
It will allow us some new insights into the claim of LeRoy and Porter [1981] and Shiller [1981] that stocks are excessively volatile to be justified in terms of information about 2. This quote is from a private letter from Paul Samuelson to John Campbell and Robert Shiller.
The quote appears, and is discussed, in Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2 nd Edition, 2001, p. 243. Samuelson's dictum is also treated in Samuelson [1998] . future dividends, and the conclusion of Campbell [1991] that variance of news about future cash flows accounts for only a third to a half of the variance of unexpected stock returns.
Our use of individual stock data over a 75-year interval also allows us another advantage over tests of market efficiency based on stock-price indexes. When we assume that stock prices are, according to efficient markets theory, optimal forecasts of the present value of dividends discounted by an estimated constant rate, it follows that the present value gives weight to future dividends many years in the future. Since few firms survive as separate firms for as long a time as the present value formula gives substantial weight to, the efficient markets model has usually been tested using stock price indexes, which continue without interruptions through time. But with stock price indexes, the changing composition of the index over the years means that the subsequent dividends reported for the index at time t+k are not the dividends accruing on the stocks comprising the index at time t. While one may argue that this changing composition of the index is not a problem for index-based tests of market efficiency, it does introduce a layer of complexity to the analysis. In this paper, we take the simpler approach of just looking at how well individual stock prices relative to dividends predict the stock's actual own dividend changes far into the future.
The Efficient Markets Model in Dynamic Gordon Model Form
One way of writing the simple efficient markets model expresses the dividendprice ratio as a function of expected future dividend growth. Assuming a constant discount rate but varying growth rate of real dividends, the dividend-price ratio D t /P t can be derived from the simple expected present value relation with discount rate r as;
, where , where g is the constant expected dividend growth rate. The equation (1) implies that at times when the dividend-price ratio is high, it portends relatively low growth of dividends over future years, while when the dividend-price ratio is low, it portends relatively rapid growth of dividends over future years. We take this model as representing the essence of the simple efficient markets model. While there are other versions of the efficient markets model, with additional complexities, this simple version g r P D − = / 3. Note that efficient markets theory implies (1) even if firms repurchase shares in lieu of paying as much dividends: the share repurchase has the effect of raising subsequent per-share dividends. 4. Campbell and Shiller [1988a, 1988b] used a log-approximation of the dividend-price model as follows;
The formula is closely analogous to (1) in this paper.
has sufficient currency in public thinking, at least as a first approximation, to warrant learning whether it is at least approximately true.
We could in theory evaluate this model, after turning the efficient markets equation around to , by regressing, with time series data, onto a constant and the dividend price ratio
t /P t , and testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of D t /P t is minus one. Such a test of the efficient markets hypothesis would be recommended by its simplicity and immediacy. There is however the practical difficulty that the summation extends to infinity and so the right hand side can never be computed with finite data. Campbell and Shiller [1988b] showed a rigorous way of testing a loglinearized version of this model under the assumption of a vector autoregressive model for the change in log dividends and the log dividend-price ratio. model, involving time-varying interest rates, were also explored using a generalization of this model, and also found wanting, Campbell and Shiller [1988a] . In this paper, which concentrates on individual firm differences, we focus on the simpler version of the model, with constant discount rates, since this version represents the most popular version of efficient markets theory, asserting just that movements in the price of any stock relative to its dividend reflect new information about the outlook for the future payoff of that stock. either the time-series or cross-sectional ability of the dividend-price ratio to predict future changes in dividends.
Running the Regression with Individual Stock Data
Using monthly data from the CRSP tape, we create the series of annual dividends, D t , by summing up twelve monthly dividends from January to December of the year; the price P t is for the end of the year. 7 We exclude from the series non-ordinary dividends due to liquidation, acquisition, reorganization, rights offering, and stock splits. All the dividends and stock prices are adjusted by the proper price adjustment factors obtained from the CRSP tape and then are expressed in real terms using the Consumer Price index.
As a proxy for the future dividend growth we use , the summation truncated after
and we set r equal to 0.064, which is the annual average return over all firms and dates in the sample. The results are invariant to the starting month for the calculation of annual dividends. We also work on the same estimation using the data of survival firms after World War II. There are 125 firms that have existed during the 1946-2001 period without any missing information on stock prices and dividends. The results of the regressions on these samples are basically similar to those reported in the paper. 8. We avoid the common practice of using the terminal price, P t+K to infer dividend changes beyond t+K since that would bring us back to using a sort of return variable as the dependent variable in our regressions: we want our method to have a simple interpretation, here just whether observations). If there were no problem of survivorship bias and if the truncation of our infinite sum for were not a problem, then we would expect that the slope in the regressions should be minus one and the intercept be the average return on the market. In fact, the truncation of the infinite sum means that the coefficient might be something other than minus one. Hence, we merely test here for the negativity of the coefficient of the dividend-price ratio, looking only to see if it is significant in predicting future dividend changes in the right direction. Because of survivorship bias, the fact that we are looking only at surviving firms would appear to put a possible upward bias on the intercept, and hence we do not focus on the intercept here. here, and we report it only for completeness. For K=10, 15, 20, and 25 the t-statistic is highly significant and negative. As K is increased, the coefficient of the dividend-price ratio decreases, and at K=75, the coefficient is very close to its theoretical value of -1.00
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(though poorly measured since only 1926 D/P are used). These results provide impressive evidence for the Gordon model as applied to individual firm data in the sense that the estimated coefficients are significantly negative, though usually above minus one. result for the efficient markets model that Campbell and Shiller [1988a] found with a much broader stock market index.
The t-statistics reported for Panel C are for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of D/P is zero; the statistics are much larger against the efficient markets hypothesis that the coefficient equals minus one. However, there is an issue that the distribution of our tstatistics may not approximate the normal distribution if D/P is nonstationary, or nearly so. While our financial theory suggests that the dividend yield should be stationary, in fact the dividend yield is at best slowly mean-reverting. Elliott and Stock [1994] show that the size distortion in the t-statistic caused by near-unit root behavior may be substantial. Campbell and Yogo [2002] show however that if we rule out explosive processes for the dividend-price ratio in regressions like those of panel C, there is good evidence against market efficiency.
We interpret these results as confirming the Samuelson Dictum. In our results there is substantial evidence that individual firm dividend-price ratios predict future dividend growth in the right direction, but no evidence that aggregate dividend-price ratios do. represents nothing more than a situation in which the firm attempted to maintain its dividend level in spite of rapidly declining fortunes. Its stock price fell precipitously after the 1929 crash, converting a roughly 8% dividend into a 40% dividend, which was cut to zero in 1932, and held there for many years. This extreme case may be regarded as a victory for the efficient markets model, in that it does show that the dividend-price ratio predicts future dividend growth, though not the usual case we think of when we consider market efficiency. It is plain from the fact that the points are so dense around the lower envelope line, that much of the fit derives from firms whose dividends dropped sharply.
A Look at the Data
Another simple story is that of firms that pay zero dividends. Note that all firmyear pairs with zero dividends can be seen arrayed next to the vertical axis, and that the dividend growth for these firms tends to be higher than for the firms with non-zero dividends, as the dynamic Gordon model would predict. Firms with zero dividends showed higher dividend growth as measured by : the mean for the zero-dividend observations is 0.149, which, is greater than r=0.064, possibly reflecting the selection bias for surviving firms noted above. The fact that these points along the vertical axis cluster above 0.064 might also be considered a sort of approximate victory for market efficiency. Also note that even if we deleted these firms, there still is a pronounced negative slope to the scatter. The predictive ability of the dynamic Gordon model is not just due to the phenomenon of zero dividends.
Even if we delete all observations of zero dividends, and look at dividend price ratios less than the discount rate r, that is, less than 0.064, then the slope of the regression line for K=25 changes to -0.479, not much closer to zero. This means that there are also observations of a low but non-zero dividend-price ratio successfully predicting abovenormal dividend growth.
Regression diagnostics following Belsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980] revealed that no particularly influential observations were responsible for the results in the pooled regressions.
Summary
With these data on the universe of U. S. individual firms on the CRSP tape with continuous data since 1926 Samuelson's dictum appears to have some validity. Over the interval of U. S. history since 1926, individual-firm dividend-price ratios have had some significant predictive power for subsequent growth rates in real dividends: this is evidence of micro-efficiency. A look at a scatter plot of the data confirms that this result is not exclusively due to zero dividends. Moreover, when the 49 firms are aggregated into an index, the dividend-price ratio gets the wrong sign in the regressions, and is usually insignificant. If anything, high aggregate dividend-price ratios predict high aggregate dividend growth, and so there is no evidence of macro efficiency.
11
The very negative results on the efficiency of the stock market that were reported by LeRoy and Porter [1981] and Shiller [1981] appear to apply much more to the aggregate stock market than to individual stocks.
11. The results are consistent with those of Vuolteenaho (2002) , who uses firm-level data in conjunction with a vector autoregressive model and a variance decomposition along lines first described in Campbell [1991] to conclude that firm level stock returns are predominantly driven by fundamentals. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho [2002] provide a similar variance decomposition of firm-level price to book ratios, finding that fundamentals predominate. Jung [2002] finds using variance and covariance ratio tests that individual stock returns show quite different mean reversion characteristics from the portfolio of them. 
